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Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental
limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as
Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new
settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative
game theory allows one to understand aspects of all these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players
in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied
in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on
the one hand and properties of rate, capacity, or other resource allocation regions on the other.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A central problem in information theory is the determina-
tion of rate regions in data compression problems and that
of capacity regions in communication problems. Although
single-letter characterizations of these regions were given for
lossless data compression of one source and for communica-
tion from one transmitter to one receiver by Shannon him-
self, more elaborate scenarios involving data compression
from many correlated sources or communication between
a network of users remain of great theoretical and practical
interest, with many key problems remaining open. In these
multiuser scenarios, rate and capacity regions are subsets
of some Euclidean space whose dimension depends on the
number of users. The search for an “optimal” rate point is
no longer trivial, even if the rate region is known, because
of the fact that there is no natural total ordering on points
of Euclidean space. Indeed, it is important to ask in the
first place what optimality means in the multiuser context—
typical criteria for optimality, depending on the scenario of
interest, would derive from considerations of fairness, net
efficiency, extraneous costs, or robustness to various kinds
of network failures.
Our primary goal in this paper is to point out that
notions from cooperative game theory arise in a very natural
way in connection with the study of rate and capacity regions
for several important problems. Examples of these problems
include Slepian-Wolf source coding, multiple access chan-
nels, and certain distributed estimation problems for sensor
networks. Using notions from cooperative game theory,
certain properties of the rate regions follow from appropriate
information inequalities. In the case of Slepian-Wolf coding
and multiple access channels, these results are very well
known; perhaps some of the interpretations are unusual, but
the experts will not find them surprising. In the case of the
distributed estimation setting, the results are recent and the
interpretation is new. We supplement the analysis of these
rate regions by pointing out that the classical capacity-based
theory of composite hypothesis testing pioneered by Huber
and Strassen also has a game-theoretic interpretation, but in
terms of games with an uncountable infinity of players. Since
most of our results concern new interpretations of known
facts, we label them as Translations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, some
basic facts from the theory of cooperative games are
reviewed. Section 3 treats using the game-theoretic frame-
work the distributed compression problem solved by Slepian
andWolf. The extreme points of the Slepian-Wolf rate region
are interpreted in terms of robustness to certain kinds of net-
work failures, and allocations of rates to users that are “fair”
or “tolerable” are also discussed. Section 4 considers various
classes of multiple access channels. An interesting special
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case is the Gaussian multiple access channel, where the game
associated with the standard setting has significantly nicer
structure than the game studied by La and Anantharam
[1] associated with an arbitrarily varying setting. Section 5
describes a model for distributed estimation using sensor
networks and studies a game associated with allocation of
risks for this model. Section 6 looks at various games involv-
ing the entropies and entropy powers of sums. These do not
seem to have an operational interpretation but are related
to recently developed information inequalities. Section 7
discusses connections of the game-theoretic framework with
the theory of robust hypothesis testing. Finally, Section 8
contains some concluding remarks.
2. A REVIEWOF COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY
The theory of cooperative games is classical in the economics
and game theory literature and has been extensively devel-
oped. The basic setting of such a game consists of n players,
who can form arbitrary coalitions s ⊂ [n], where [n] denotes
the set {1, 2, . . . ,n} of players. A game is specified by the set
[n] of players, and a value function v: 2[n]→R+, where R+ is
the nonnegative real numbers, and it is always assumed that
v(φ) = 0. The value of a coalition s is equal to v(s).
We will usually interpret the cooperative game (in its
standard form) as the setting for a cost allocation problem.
Suppose that player i contributes an amount of ti. Since the
game is assumed to involve (linearly) transferable utility, the
cumulative cost to the players in the coalition s is simply∑
i∈sti. Since each coalition must pay its due of v(s), the
individual costs ti must satisfy
∑
i∈sti ≥ v(s) for every s ⊂
[n]. This set of cost vectors, namely
A(v) =
{
t ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i∈s
ti ≥ v(s) for each s ⊂ [n]
}
, (1)
is the set of aspirations of the game, in the sense that this set
defines what the players can aspire to. The goal of the game
is to minimize social cost, that is, the total sum of the costs∑
i∈[n]ti. Clearly this minimum is achieved when
∑
i∈[n]ti =
v([n]). This leads to the definition of the core of a game.
Definition 1. The core of a game v is the set of aspiration
vectors t ∈ A(v) such that∑i∈[n]ti = v([n]).
One may think of the core of an arbitrary game as the
intersection of the set of aspirations A(v) and the “efficiency
hyperplane”:
F(v) =
{
t ∈ Rn :
∑
i∈[n]
ti = v([n])
}
. (2)
The core can be equivalently defined as the set of
undominated imputations; see, for example, Owen’s book
[2] for this approach, and a proof of the equivalence. In
this paper, we will not consider the question of where the
value function of a game comes from but rather take the
value function as given and study the corresponding game
using structural results from game theory. However, in the
original economic interpretation, one should think of v(s)
as the amount of utility that the members of s can obtain
from the game whatever the remaining players may do. Then,
one can interpret ti as the payoff to the ith player and v(s) as
the minimum net payoff to the members of the coalition s
that they will accept. This gives the aspiration set a slightly
different interpretation. Indeed, the aspiration set can be
thought of as the set of payoff vectors to players that no
coalition would block as being inadequate. For the purposes
of this paper, one may think of a cooperative game either in
terms of payoffs as discussed in this paragraph or in terms of
cost allocation as described earlier.
A pathbreaking result in the theory of transferable utility
games was the Bondareva-Shapley theorem characterizing
whether the core of the game is empty. First, we need to
define the notion of a balanced game.
Definition 2. Given a collection C of subsets of [n], a
function α : C→R+ is a fractional partition if for each i ∈ [n],
we have
∑
s∈C:i∈Sα(s) = 1. A game is balanced if
v([n]) ≥
∑
s∈C
α(s)v(s) (3)
for any fractional partition α for any collection C.
Actually, to check that a game is balanced, one does not
need to show the inequality (3) for all fractional partitions
for all collections C. It is sufficient to check (3) for “minimal
balanced collections” (and these collections turn out to yield
a unique fractional partition). Details may be found, for
example, in Owen [2].
We now state the Bondareva-Shapley theorem [3, 4].
Fact 1. The core of a game is nonempty if and only if the
game is balanced.
Proof. Consider the linear program:
Maximize
∑
s⊂[n]
α(s)v(s),
subject to α(s) ≥ 0 for each s ⊂ [n],∑
s⊂[n],s% j
α(s) = 1 for each j ∈ [n].
(4)
The dual problem is easily obtained
Minimize
∑
j∈[n]
t j,
subject to
∑
j∈s
t j ≥ v(s) for each s ⊂ [n]. (5)
If p∗ and d∗ denote the primal and dual optimal values,
duality theory tells us that p∗ = d∗. Also, the game being
balanced means p∗ ≤ v([n]), while the core being nonempty
means that d∗ ≤ v([n]). (Note that by setting α(s) = 0 for
some subsets s ⊂ [n], fractional partitions using arbitrary
collections of sets can be thought of as fractional partitions
using the full power set 2[n].) Thus, the game having a
nonempty core is equivalent to its being balanced.
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An important class of games is that of convex games.
Definition 3. A game is convex if
v(s∪ t) + v(s∩ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t) (6)
for any sets s and t. (In this case, the set function v is also said
to be supermodular.)
The connection between convexity and balancedness
goes back to Shapley.
Fact 2. A convex game is balanced and has nonempty core;
the converse need not hold.
Proof. Shapley [5] showed that convex games have nonempty
core, hence they must be balanced by Fact 1. A direct proof
by induction of the fact that convexity implies fractional
superadditivity inequalities (which include balancedness) is
given in [6].
Incidentally, Maschler et al. [7] (cf., Edmonds [8])
noticed that the dimension of the core of a convex game was
determined by the decomposability of the game, which is a
measure of how much “additivity” (as opposed to the kind
of superadditivity imposed by convexity) there is in the value
function of the game.
There are various alternative characterizations of convex
games that are of interest. For any game v and any ordering
(permutation) σ = (i1, . . . , in) on [n], the marginal worth
vectormσ(v) ∈ Rn is defined by
mσik (v) = v({i1, . . . , ik})− v({i1, . . . , ik−1}) (7)
for each k > 1, and mσi1 (v) = v({i1}). The convex hull of
all the marginal vectors is called the Weber set . Weber [9]
showed that the Weber set of any game contains its core.
The Shapley-Ichiishi theorem [5, 10] says that the Weber set
is identical to the core if and only if the game is convex. In
particular, the extreme points of the core of a convex game
are precisely the marginal vectors.
This characterization of convex games is obviously useful
from an optimization point of view, as studied deeply
by Edmonds [8] in the closely related theory of poly-
matroids. Indeed, polymatroids (strictly speaking, contra-
polymatroids) may simply be thought of as the aspiration
sets of convex games. Note that in the presence of the convex-
ity condition, the assumption that v takes only nonnegative
values is equivalent to the nondecreasing condition v(s) ≤
v(t) if s ⊂ t. Since a linear program is solved at extreme
points, the results of Edmonds (stated in the language of
polymatroids) and Shapley (stated in the language of convex
games) imply that any linear function defined on the core
of a convex game (or the dominant face of a polymatroid)
must be extremized at a marginal vector. Edmonds [8]
uses this to develop greedy methods for such optimization
problems. Historically speaking, the two parallel theories
of polymatroids and convex games were developed around
the same time in the mid-1960s with awareness of and
stimulated by each other (as evidenced by a footnote in [5]);
however, in information theory, this parallelism does not
seem to be part of the folklore, and the game interpretation
of rate or capacity regions has only been used to the author’s
knowledge in the important paper of La and Anantharam
[1].
The Shapley value of a game v is the centroid of the
marginal vectors:
φ[v] = 1
n!
∑
σ∈Sn
mσ , (8)
where Sn is the symmetric group consisting of all permuta-
tions. As shown by Shapley [11], its components are given
by
φi[v] =
∑
s%i
(|s|− 1)!(n− |s|)!
n!
[
v(s)− υ(s \ {i})
]
, (9)
and it is the unique vector satisfying the following axioms:
(a) φ lies in the efficiency hyperplane F(v), (b) it is invariant
under permutation of players, and (c) if u and v are two
games, then φ[u + v] = φ[u] + φ[v]. Clearly, the Shapley
value gives one possible formalization of the notion of a “fair
allocation” to the players in the game.
Fact 3. For a convex game, the Shapley value is in the core.
Proof. As pointed out by Shapley [5], this simply follows
from the representation of the Shapley value as a convex
combination of marginal vectors and the fact that the core
of a convex game contains its Weber set.
For a cooperative game, convexity is quite a strong
property. It implies, in particular, both that the game is exact
and that it has a large core; we describe these notions below.
If
∑
i∈syi ≥ v(s) for each s, does there exist x in the core
such that x ≤ y (component-wise)? If so, the core is said to
be large. Sharkey [12] showed that not all balanced games
have large cores, and that not all games with large cores are
convex. However, [12] also showed the following fact.
Fact 4. A convex game has a large core.
A game with value function v is said to be exact if for
every set s ⊂ [n], there exists a cost vector t in the core of the
game such that ∑
i∈s
ti = v(s). (10)
Since for any point in the core, the net cost to the members
of s is at least v(s), a game is exact if and only if
v(s) = min
{∑
i∈s
ti : t is in the core of v
}
. (11)
The exactness and large core properties are not comparable
(counterexamples can be found in [12] and Biswas et al.
[13]). However, Schmeidler [14] showed the following fact.
Fact 5. A convex game is exact.
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Interestingly, Rabie [15] showed that the Shapley value of
an exact game need not be in its core.
One may define, in an exactly complementary way to
the above development, cooperative games that deal with
resource allocation rather than cost allocation. The set of
aspirations for a resource allocation game is
A(v) =
{
t ∈ Rn+ :
∑
i∈s
ti ≤ v(s) for each s ⊂ [n]
}
, (12)
and the core is the intersection of this set with the effi-
ciency hyperplane F(v) defined in (2), which represents the
maximum achievable resource for the grand coalition of all
players, and thus a public good. A resource allocation game
is concave if
v(s∪ t) + v(s∩ t) ≤ v(s) + v(t) (13)
for any sets s and t. The concavity of a game can be thought
of as the “decreasing marginal returns” property of the value
function, which is well motivated by economics.
One can easily formulate equivalent versions of Facts 1,
2, 3, 4, and 5 for resource allocation games. For instance, the
analogue of Fact 1 is that the core of a resource allocation
game is nonempty if and only if
υ([n]) ≤
∑
S∈C
α(s)υ(s) (14)
for each fractional partition α for any collection of subsets
C (we call this property also balancedness, with some slight
abuse of terminology). This follows from the fact that
the duality used to prove Fact 1 remains unchanged if we
simultaneously change the signs of {ti} and υ, and reverse
relevant inequalities.
Notions from cooperative game theory also appear in the
more recently developed theory of combinatorial auctions.
In combinatorial auction theory, the interpretation is slightly
different, but it remains an economic interpretation, and
so we discuss it briefly to prepare the ground for some
additional insights that we will obtain from it. Consider a
resource allocation game v: 2[n]→R, where [n] indexes the
items available on auction. Think of v(s) as the amount that
a bidder in an auction is willing to pay for the particular
bundle of items indexed by s. In designing the rules of
an auction, one has to take into account all the received
bids, represented by a number of such set functions or
“valuations” v. The auction design then determines how to
make an allocation of items to bidders, and computational
concerns often play a major role.
We wish to highlight a fact that has emerged from
combinatorial auction theory; first we need a definition
introduced by Lehmann et al. [16].
Definition 4. A set function v is additive if there exist non-
negative real numbers t1, . . . , tn such that v(s) = ∑i∈sti for
each s ⊂ [n]. A set function v is XOS, if there are additive
value functions v1, . . . , vM for some positive integer M such
that
v(s) = max
j∈[M]
vj(s). (15)
The terminology XOS emerged as an abbreviation for
“XOR of OR of singletons” and was motivated by the need
to represent value functions efficiently (without storing all
2n − 1 values) in the computer science literature. Feige [17]
proves the following fact, by a modification of the argument
for the Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
Fact 6. A game has an XOS value function if and only if the
game is balanced.
By analogy with the definition of exactness for cost
allocation games, a resource allocation game is exact if and
only if
v(s) = max
{∑
i∈s
ti : t is in the core of v
}
. (16)
In other words, for an exact game, the additive value fun-
ctions in the XOS representation of the game can be taken
to be those corresponding to the elements of the core (if we
allow maximizing over a potentially infinite set of additive
value functions).
Some of the concepts elaborated in this section can be
extended to games with infinitely many players, although
many new technicalities arise. Indeed, there is a whole theory
of so-called “nonatomic games” in the economics literature.
This is briefly alluded to in Section 7, where we discuss an
example of an infinite game.
3. THE SLEPIAN-WOLF GAME
The Slepian-Wolf problem refers to the problem of loss-
lessly compressing data from two correlated sources in
a distributed manner. Let p(x1, . . . , xn) denote the joint
probability mass function of the sources (X1, . . . ,Xn) = X[n],
which take values in discrete alphabets. When the sources
are coded in a centralized manner, any rate R > H(X[n])
(in bits per symbol) is sufficient, where H denotes the joint
entropy, that is, H(X[n]) = E[−logp(x1, . . . , xn)]. What rates
are achievable when the sources must be coded separately?
This problem was solved for i.i.d sources by Slepian andWolf
[18] and extended to jointly ergodic sources using a binning
argument by Cover [19].
Fact 7. Correlated sources (X1, . . . ,Xn) can be described
separately at rates (R1, . . . ,Rn) and recovered with arbitrarily
low error probability by a common decoder if and only if∑
i∈s
Ri ≥ H
(
Xs | Xsc
) =: vSW(s) (17)
for each s ⊂ [n]. In other words, the Slepian-Wolf rate region
is the set of aspirations of the cooperative game vSW, which
we call the Slepian-Wolf game.
A key consequence is that using only knowledge of the
joint distribution of the data, one can achieve a compression
rate equal to the joint entropy of the users (i.e., there is
no loss from the incapability to communicate). However,
this is not automatic from the characterization of the rate
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region above; one needs to check that the Slepian-Wolf game
is balanced. The balancedness of the Slepian-Wolf game is
precisely the content of the lower bound in the following
inequality of Madiman and Tetali [6]: for any fractional
partition α using C,∑
S∈C
α(s)H
(
Xs | Xsc
) ≤ H(X[n]) ≤ ∑
S∈C
α(s)H(Xs). (18)
This weak fractional form of the joint entropy inequalities
in [6] coupled with Fact 1 proves that the joint entropy is
an achievable sum rate even for distributed compression. In
fact, the Slepian-Wolf game is much nicer.
Translation 1. The Slepian-Wolf game is a convex game.
Proof. To show that the Slepian-Wolf game is convex, we
need to show that vSW(s) = H(Xs | Xsc) is supermodular.
This fact was first explicitly pointed out by Fujishige
[20].
By applying Fact 2, the core is nonempty since the game
is convex, whichmeans that there exists a rate point satisfying∑
i∈[n]
Ri = vSW([n]) = H
(
X[n]
)
. (19)
This recovers the fact that a sum rate ofH(X[n]) is achievable.
Note that, combined with Fact 1, this observation in turn
gives an immediate proof of the inequality (18).
We now look at how robust this situation is to network
degradation because some users drop out. First note that by
Fact 5, the Slepian-Wolf game is exact. Hence, for any subset
s of users, there exists a vector R = (R1, . . . ,Rn) that is sum-
rate optimal for the grand coalition of all users, which is also
sum-rate optimal for the users in s, that is,
∑
i∈sRi = vSW(s).
However, in general, it is not possible to find a rate vector
that is simultaneously sum-rate optimal for multiple proper
subsets of users. Below, we observe that finding such a rate
vector is possible if the subsets of interest arise from users
potentially dropping out in a certain order.
Translation 2 (Robust Slepian-Wolf coding). Suppose the
users can only drop out in a certain order, which without loss
of generality we can take to be the natural decreasing order
on [n] (i.e., we assume that the first user to potentially drop
out would be user n, followed by user n−1, etc.). Then, there
exists a rate point for Slepian-Wolf coding which is feasible
and optimal irrespective of the number of users that have
dropped out.
Proof. The solution to this problem is related to a modified
Slepian-Wolf game, given by the utility function:
vSW(s) = H
(
Xs | Xsc\>s
)
, (20)
where > s = {i ∈ [n] : i > j for every j ∈ s}. Indeed, if this
game is shown to have a nonempty core, then there exists a
rate point which is simultaneously in the Slepian-Wolf rate
region of every [k], for k ∈ [n]. However, the nonemptiness
of the core is equivalent to the balancedness of vSW, which
follows from the inequality
H
(
X[n]
) ≥ ∑
S∈C
α(s)H
(
Xs | Xsc\>s
)
, (21)
where α is any fractional partition using C, which was
proved by Madiman and Tetali [6]. To see that the core
of this modified game actually contains an optimal point
(i.e., a point in the core of the subgame corresponding to
the first k users) for each k, simply note that the marginal
vector corresponding to the natural order on [n] gives a
constructive example.
The main idea here is known in the literature, although
not interpreted or proved in this fashion. Indeed, other
interpretations and uses of the extreme points of the Slepian-
Wolf rate region are discussed, for example, in Coleman et al.
[21], Cristescu et al. [22], and Ramamoorthy [23].
It is interesting to interpret some of the game-theoretic
facts described in Section 2 for the Slepian-Wolf game. This
is particularly useful when there is no natural ordering on the
set of players, but rather our goal is to identify a permutation-
invariant (and more generally, a “fair”) rate point. By Fact 3,
we have the following translation.
Translation 3. The Shapley value of the Slepian-Wolf game
satisfies the following properties. (a) It is in the core of the
Slepian-Wolf game, and hence is sum-rate optimal. (b) It
is a fair allocation of compression rates to users because it
is permutation-invariant. (c) Suppose an additional set of n
sources, independent of the first n, is introduced. Suppose
the Shapley values of the Slepian-Wolf games for the first set
of sources is φ1, and for the second set of sources is φ2. If each
source from the first set is paired with a distinct source from
the second set, then the Shapley value for the Slepian-Wolf
game played by the set of pairs is φ1 +φ2. (In other words, the
“fair” allocation for the pair can be “fairly” split up among
the partners in the pair.)
It is pertinent to note, moreover, that implementing
Slepian-Wolf coding at any point in the core is practically
implementable. While it has been noticed for some time that
one can efficiently construct codebooks that nearly achieve
the rates at an extreme point of the core, Coleman et al.
[21], building on work of Rimoldi and Urbanke [24] in the
multiple access channel setting, show a practical approach
to efficient coding for any rate point in the core (based on
viewing any such rate point as an extreme point of the core
of a Slepian-Wolf game for a larger set of sources).
Fact 4 says that the Slepian-Wolf game has a large core,
which may be interpreted as follows.
Translation 4. Suppose, for each i, Ti is the maximum
compression rate that user i is willing to tolerate. A tolerance
vector T = (T1, . . . ,Tn) is said to be feasible if∑
i∈s
Ti ≥ vSW(s) (22)
for each s ⊂ [n]. Then, for any feasible tolerance vector T ,
it is always possible to find a rate point R = (R1, . . . ,Rn) in
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the core so that Ri ≤ Ti (i.e., the rate point is tolerable to all
users).
4. MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS ANDGAMES
Amultiple access channel (MAC) refers to a channel between
multiple independent senders (the data sent by the ith
sender is typically denoted Xi) and one receiver (the received
data is typically denoted Y). The channel characteristics,
defined for each transmission by a probability transition
p(y | x1, . . . , xn), is assumed to be known. We will further
restrict our discussion to the case of memoryless channels,
where each transmission is assumed to occur independently
according to the channel transition probability.
Even within the class of memoryless multiple access
channels, there are several notable special cases of interest.
The first is the discrete memoryless multiple access channel
(DM-MAC), where all random variables take values in
possibly different finite alphabets, but the channel transition
matrix is otherwise unrestricted. The second is the Gaussian
memoryless multiple access channel (G-MAC); here each
sender has a power constraint Pi, and the noise introduced
to the superposition of the data from the sources is additive
Gaussian noise with variance N . In other words,
Y =
∑
i∈[n]
Xi + Z, (23)
where Xi are the independent sources, and Z is a mean-
zero, variance N is normal independent of the sources.
Note that although the power constraints are an additional
wrinkle to the problem compared to the DM-MAC, the
G-MAC is in a sense more special because of the strong
assumption; it makes on the nature of the channel. A
third interesting special case is the Poisson memoryless
multiple access channel (P-MAC), which models optical
communication from many senders to one receiver and
operates in continuous time. Here, the channel takes in as
inputs data from the n sources in the form of waveforms
Xi(t), whose peak powers are constrained by some number
A; in other words, for each sender i, 0 ≤ Xi(t) ≤ A. The
output of the channel is a Poisson process of rate:
λ0 +
∑
i∈[n]
Xi(t), (24)
where the nonnegative constant λ0 represents the rate of
a homogeneous Poisson process (noise) called the dark
current. For further details, one may consult the references
cited below.
The capacity region of the DM-MAC was first found by
Ahlswede [25] (see also Liao [26] and Slepian andWolf [27]).
Han [28] developed a clear approach to an evenmore general
problem; he used in a fundamental way the polymatroidal
properties of entropic quantities, and thus it is no surprise
that the problem is closely connected to cooperative games.
Below I denotes mutual information (see, e.g., [29]); for
notational convenience, we suppress the dependence of the
mutual information on the joint distribution.
Fact 8. Let P be the class of joint distributions on (X[n],Y)
for which the marginal on X[n] is a product distribution,
and the conditional distribution of Y given X[n] is fixed by
the channel characteristics. For µ ∈ P , let Cµ be the set of
capacity vectors (C1, . . . ,Cn) satisfying∑
i∈s
Ci ≤ I
(
Xs;Y | Xsc
)
(25)
for each s ⊂ [n]. The capacity region of the n-user DM-MAC
is the closure of the convex hull of the union∪{Cµ : µ ∈ P }.
This rate region is more complex than the Slepian-
Wolf rate region because it is the closed convex hull of the
union of the aspiration sets of many cooperative games, each
corresponding to a product distribution on X[n]. Yet the
analogous result turns out to hold. More specifically, even
though the different senders have to code in a distributed
manner, a sum capacity can be achieved that may be
interpreted as the capacity of a single channel from the
combined set of sources (coded together).
Translation 5. The DM-MAC capacity region is the union of
the aspiration sets of a class of concave games. In particular,
a sum capacity of sup I(X[n];Y) is achievable, where the
supremum is taken over all joint distributions on (X[n],Y)
that lie in P .
Proof. Let Γ denote the set of all conditional mutual
information vectors (in the Euclidean space of dimension
2n) corresponding to the discrete distributions on (X[n],Y)
that lie in P . More precisely, corresponding to any joint
distribution inP is a point γ ∈ Γ defined by
γ(s) = I(Xs;Y | Xsc) (26)
for each s ⊂ [n]. Han [28] showed that for any joint
distribution inP , γ(s) is a submodular set function. In other
words, each point γ ∈ Γ defines a concave game.
As shown in [28], the DM-MAC capacity regionmay also
be characterized as the union of the aspiration sets of games
from Γ∗, where Γ∗ is the closure of the convex hull of Γ.
It remains to check that each point in Γ∗ corresponds to a
concave game, and this follows from the easily verifiable facts
that a convex combination of concave games is concave, and
that a limit of concave games is concave.
For the second assertion, note that for any γ ∈ Γ∗, a
sum capacity of γ([n]) is achievable by Fact 2 (applied to
resource allocation games). Combining this with the above
characterization of the capacity region and the fact that
γ([n]) = I(X[n];Y) for γ ∈ Γ completes the argument.
We now take up the G-MAC. The additive nature of the
G-MAC is reflected in a simpler game-theoretic description
of its capacity region.
Fact 9. The capacity region of the n-user G-MAC is the set of
capacity allocations (C1, . . . ,Cn) that satisfy
∑
i∈s
Ci ≤ C
(∑
i∈sPi
N
)
=: vg(s) (27)
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for each s ⊂ [n], where C(x) = (1/2)log(1 + x). In other
words, the capacity region of the G-MAC is the aspiration
set of the game defined by vg , which we may call the G-MAC
game.
Translation 6. The G-MAC game is a concave game. In
particular, its core is nonempty, and a sum capacity of
C(
∑
i∈[n]Pi/N) is achievable.
As in the previous section, we may ask whether this is
robust to network degradation in the form of users dropping
out, at least in some order; the answer is obtained in an
exactly analogous fashion.
Translation 7 (Robust coding for the G-MAC). Suppose the
senders can only drop out in a certain order, which without
loss of generality we can take to be the natural decreasing
order on [n] (i.e., we assume that the first user to potentially
drop out would be sender n, followed by sender n − 1, etc.).
Then, there exists a capacity allocation to senders for the
G-MAC which is feasible and optimal irrespective of the
number of users that have dropped out.
Furthermore, just as for the Slepian-Wolf game, Fact 4
has an interpretation in terms of tolerance vectors analogous
to Translation 4. When there is no natural ordering of
senders, Fact 3 suggests that the Shapley value is a good
choice of capacity allocation for the G-MAC game. Practical
implementation of an arbitrary capacity allocation point in
the core is discussed by Rimoldi and Urbanke [24] and Yeh
[30].
While the ground for the study of the geometry of the G-
MAC capacity region using the theory of polymatroids was
laid by Han, such a study and its implications were further
developed, and in the more general setting of fading that
allows the modeling of wireless channels, by Tse and Hanly
[31] (see also [30]). Clearly statements like Translation 7 can
be carried over to the more general setting of fading channels
by building on the observations made in [31].
La and Anantharam [1] provide an elegant analysis of
capacity allocation for a different Gaussian MAC model
using cooperative game theoretic ideas. We briefly review
their results in the context of the preceding discussion.
Consider an Gaussian multiple access channel that is
arbitrarily varying , in the sense that the users are potentially
hostile, aware of each others’ codebooks, and are capable of
forming “jamming coalitions”. A jamming coalition is a set
of users, say sc, who decide not to communicate but instead
get together and jam the channel for the remaining users,
who constitute the communicating coalition s. As before,
each user has a power constraint; the ith sender cannot use
power greater than Pi whether it wishes to communicate or
jam. It is still a Gaussian MAC because the received signal is
the superposition of the inputs provided by all the senders,
plus additive Gaussian noise of variance N . In [1], the value
function vLA for the game corresponding to this channel is
derived; the value for a coalition s is the capacity achievable
by the users in s even when the users in sc coherently combine
to jam the channel.
Fact 10. The capacity region of the arbitrarily varying Gaus-
sian MAC with potentially hostile senders is the aspiration
set of the La-Anantharam game, defined by
vLA(s) := C
(
Pŝ
Λsc +N
)
, (28)
where Ps = ∑i∈sPi, Λs = [∑i∈s√Pi]2, and ŝ = {i ∈ s : Pi ≥
Λsc}.
Note that two things have changed relative to the naive G-
MAC game; the power available for transmission (appearing
in the numerator of the argument of the C function)
is reduced because some senders are rendered incapable
of communicating by the jammers, and the noise term
(appearing in the denominator) is no longer constant for all
coalitions but is augmented by the power of the jammers.
This tightening of the aspiration set of the La-Anantharam
game versus the G-MAC game causes the concavity property
to be lost.
Translation 8. The La-Anantharam game is not a concave
game, but it has a nonempty core. In particular, a sum
capacity of C(
∑
i∈[n]Pi/N) is achievable.
Proof. La and Anantharam [1] show that the Shapley value
need not lie in the core of their game, but they demonstrate
the existence of another distinguished point in the core. By
the analogue of Fact 3 for resource allocation games, the La-
Anantharam game cannot be concave.
Although [1] shows that the Shapley value may not lie in
the core, they demonstrate the existence of a unique capacity
point that satisfies three desirable axioms: (a) efficiency,
(b) invariance to permutation, and (c) envy-freeness. While
the first two are also among the Shapley value axioms, [1]
provides justification for envy-freeness as an appropriate
axiom from the point of view of applications.
We mention here a natural question that we leave for
the reader to ponder: given that the La-Anantharam game is
balanced but not concave, is it exact? Note that the fact that
the Shapley value does not lie in the core is not incompatible
with exactness, as shown by Rabie [15].
Finally, we turn to the P-MAC. Lapidoth and Shamai [32]
performed a detailed study of this communication problem
and showed in particular that the capacity region when all
users have the same peak power constraint is given as the
closed convex hull of the union of aspiration sets of certain
games, just as in the case of the DM-MAC. As in that case,
one may check that the capacity region is in fact the union of
aspiration sets of a class of concave games, and in particular,
as shown in [32], the maximum throughput that one may
hope for is achievable.
Of course, there is much more to the well-developed
theory of multiple access channels than the memoryless
scenarios (discrete, Gaussian and Poisson) discussed above.
For instance, there is much recent work on multiuser
channels with memory and also with feedback (see, e.g.,
Tatikonda [33] for a deep treatment of such problems at
the intersection of communication and control). We do not
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discuss these works further, except to make the observation
that things can change considerably in these more general
scenarios. Indeed, it is quite conceivable that the appropriate
games for these scenarios are not convex or concave, and it
is even conceivable that such games may not be balanced,
which may mean that there are unexpected limitations to
achieving the sum rate or sum capacity that one may hope
for at first sight.
5. A DISTRIBUTED ESTIMATION GAME
In the nascent theory of distributed estimation using sensor
networks, one wishes to characterize the fundamental limits
of performing statistical tasks such as parameter estimation
using a sensor network and apply such characterizations to
problems of cost or resource allocation. We discuss one such
question for a toy model for distributed estimation intro-
duced by Madiman et al. [34]. By ignoring communication,
computation, and other constraints, this model allows one
to study the central question of fundamental statistical limits
without obfuscation.
The model we consider is as follows. The goal is to
estimate a parameter θ, which is some unknown real number.
Consider a class of sensors, all of which have estimating
θ as their goal. However, the sensors cannot measure θ
directly; they are immersed in a field of sources (that do
not depend on θ and may be considered as producers of
noise for the purposes of estimating θ). More specifically,
suppose there are n sources, with each source producing a
data sample of size M according to some known probability
distribution. Let us say that source i generates Xi,1, . . . ,Xi,M .
The class of sensors available corresponds to a class C of
subsets of [n], which indexes the set of sources. Owing
to the geographical placement of the sensors or for other
reasons, each sensor only sees certain aggregate data; indeed,
the sensor corresponding to a subset s ⊂ [n], known as
the s-sensor, only sees at any given time the sum of θ and
the data coming from the sources in the set s. In other
words, the s-sensor has access to the observations Ys =
(Ys,1,Ys,2, . . . ,Ys,M), where
Ys, j = θ +
∑
i∈s
Xi, j . (29)
Clearly, θ shows up as a common location parameter for the
observations seen by any sensor.
From the observations Ys that are available to it, the
s-sensor constructs an estimator θ̂s(Ys) of the unknown
parameter θ. The goodness of an estimator is measured by
comparing to the “best possible estimator in the worst case”,
that is, by comparing the risk of the given estimator with
the minimax risk. If the risk is measured in terms of mean
squared error, then the minimax risk achievable by the s-
sensor is
rM(s) = min
all estimators θ̂s
max
θ
E
[
θ̂s(Ys)− θ
]2
. (30)
(For location parameters, Girshick and Savage [35] showed
that there exists an estimator that achieves this minimax
risk.)
The cost measure of interest in this scenario is error
variance. Suppose we can give variance permissions Vi
for each source, that is, the s-sensor is only allowed an
unbiased estimator with variance not more than
∑
i∈sVi, or
more generally, an estimator with mean squared risk not
more than this number. For the variance permission vector
(V1, . . . ,Vn) to be feasible with respect to an arbitrary sensor
configuration (i.e., for there to exist an estimator for the s-
user with worst-case risk bounded by
∑
i∈sVi, for every s),
we need that ∑
i∈s
Vi ≥ rM(s) (31)
for each s ⊂ [n]. Thus, we have the following fact.
Fact 11. The set of feasible variance permission vectors is the
aspiration set of the cost allocation game
vDE(s) := rM(s), (32)
which we call the distributed estimation game.
The natural question is the following. Is it possible to
allot variance permissions in such a way that there is no
wasted total variance, that is,
∑
i∈[n]Vi = rM([n]), and the
allotment is feasible for arbitrary sensor configurations? The
affirmative answer is the content of the following result.
Translation 9. Assuming that all sources have finite variance,
the distributed estimation game is balanced. Consequently,
there exists a feasible variance allotment (V1, . . . ,Vn) to
sources in [n] such that the [n]-sensor cannot waste any of
the variance allotted to it.
Proof. Themain result ofMadiman et al. [34] is the following
inequality relating the minimax risks achievable by the s-
users from the class C to the minimax risk achievable by
the [n]-user, that is, one who only sees observations of
θ corrupted by all the sources. Under the finite variance
assumption, for any sample sizeM ≥ 1,
rM([n]) ≥
∑
s∈C
β(s)rM(s) (33)
holds for any fractional partition β using any collection of
subsets C. In other words, the game vDE is balanced. Fact 1
now implies that the core is nonempty, that is, a total variance
as low as rM([n]) is achievable.
Translation 9 implies that the optimal sum of variance
permissions that can be achieved in a distributed fashion
using a sensor network is the same as the best variance that
can be achieved using a single centralized sensor that sees all
the sources.
Other interesting questions relating to sensor networks
can be answered using the inequality (33). For instance, it
suggests that using a sensor configuration corresponding to
the class C1 of all singleton sets is better than using a sensor
configuration corresponding to the class C2 of all sets of size
2. We refer the reader to [34] for details. An interesting open
problem is the determination of whether this distributed
estimation game has a large core.
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6. AN ENTROPY POWER GAME
The entropy power of a continuous random vector X is
N (X) = exp{2h(X)/d}/2pie, where h denotes differential
entropy. Entropy power plays a key role in several problems
of multiuser information theory, and entropy power inequal-
ities have been key to the determination of some capacity and
rate regions. (Such uses of entropy power inequalities may be
found, e.g., in Shannon [36], Bergmans [37], Ozarow [38],
Costa [39], and Oohama [40].) Furthermore, rate regions
for several multiuser problems, as discussed already, involve
subset sum constraints. Thus, it is conceivable that there
exists an interpretation of the discussion below in terms of
a multiuser communication problem, but we do not know of
one.
We make the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent Rd-valued ran-
dom vectors with densities and finite covariance matrices.
Suppose the region of interest is the set of points (R1, . . . ,Rn) ∈
Rn+ satisfying
∑
j∈s
Rj ≥ N
(∑
j∈s
Xj
)
(34)
for each s ⊂ [n]. Then, there exists a point in this region such
that the total sum
∑
j∈[n]Rj = N (
∑
j∈[n]Xi).
By Fact 1, the following conjecture, implicitly proposed
by Madiman and Barron [41], is equivalent.
Conjecture 2. Let X1, . . . ,Xn be independent Rd-valued ran-
dom vectors with densities and finite covariance matrices. For
any collection C of subsets of [n], let β be a fractional partition.
Then,
N (X1 + · · · + Xn) ≥
∑
s∈C
β(s)N
(∑
j∈s
Xj
)
. (35)
Equality holds if and only if all the Xi are normal with
proportional covariance matrices.
Note that Conjecture 2 simply states that the “entropy
power game” defined by vEP(s) := N (∑ j∈sXj) is balanced.
Define themaximum degree in C as r+ = maxi∈[n]r(i), where
the degree r(i) of i inC is the number of sets inC that contain
i. Madiman and Barron [41] showed that Conjecture 2 is true
if β(s) is replaced by 1/r+, where r+ is the maximum degree
in C. When every index i has the same degree, β(s) = 1/r+ is
indeed a fractional partition.
The equivalence of Conjectures 1 and 2 serves to
underscore the fact that the balancedness inequality of
Conjecture 2 may be regarded as a more fundamental prop-
erty (if true) than the generalized entropy power inequalities
in [41] and is therefore worthy of attention. The interested
reader may also wish to consult [42], where we give some
further evidence towards its validity. Of course, if the entropy
power game above turns out to be balanced, a natural next
question would be whether it is exact or even convex.
While on the topic of games involving the entropy of
sums, it is worthmentioning thatmuchmore is known about
the game with value function:
vsum(s) := H
(∑
i∈s
Xi
)
, (36)
where H denotes discrete entropy, and Xi are independent
discrete random variables. Indeed, as shown by the author in
[42], this game is concave, and in particular, has a nonempty
core which is the convex hull of its marginal vectors.
For independent continuous random vectors, the set
function
v(s) = h
(∑
i∈s
Xi
)
, (37)
where h denotes differential entropy, is submodular as in the
discrete case. However, this set function does not define a
game; indeed, the appropriate convention for v(φ) is that
v(φ) = −∞, since the null set corresponds to looking at
the differential entropy of a constant (say, zero), which is
−∞. Because of the fact that the set function v is not real-
valued, the submodularity of v does not imply that it is
even subadditive (and thus υ certainly does not satisfy the
inequalities that define balancedness). On the other hand, if
X is a continuous random vector independent of X1, . . . ,Xn,
and with differentiall entropy h(X) = 0, then the modified
set function
vsum(s) = h
(
X +
∑
s∈C
Xi
)
(38)
is indeed the value function of a balanced cooperative game;
see [42] for details and further discussion.
7. GAMES IN COMPOSITE HYPOTHESIS TESTING
Interestingly, similar notions also come up in the study
of composite hypothesis testing but in the setting of a
cooperative resource allocation game for infinitely many
users. Let (Ω,A) be a Polish space with its Borel σ-
lgebra, and let M be the space of probability measures on
(Ω,A). We may think of Ω as a set of infinitely many
“microscopic players”, namely ω ∈ Ω. The allowed coalitions
of microscopic users are the Borel sets. For our purposes, we
specify an infinite cooperative game using a value function
v :A→R that satisfies the following conditions:
(1) v(φ) = 0, and v(Ω) = 1,
(2) A ⊂ B ⇒ v(A) ≤ v(B),
(3) An ↑ A⇒ v(An) ↑ v(A),
(4) for closed sets Fn with Fn ↓ F, v(Fn) ↓ v(F).
The continuity conditions are necessary regularity con-
ditions in the context of infinitely many players. The
normalization v(Ω) = 1 (which is also sometimes imposed
in the study of finite games) is also useful. In themathematics
literature, a value function satisfying the itemized conditions
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is called a capacity , while in the economics literature, it
is a (0,1)-normalized nonatomic game (usually additional
conditions are imposed for the latter). There are many subtle
analytical issues that emerge in the study of capacities and
nonatomic games. We avoid these and simply mention some
infinite analogues of already stated facts.
For any capacity v, one may define the family of
probability measures
Pv = {P ∈M : P(A) ≤ v(A) for each A ∈A}. (39)
The set Pv may be thought of as the core of the game
v. Indeed, the additivity of a measure on disjoint sets
is the continuous formulation of the transferable utility
assumption that earlier caused us to consider sums of
resource allocations, while the restriction to probability
measures ensures efficiency, that is, the maximum possible
allocation for the full set.
LetP be a family of probability measures on (Ω,A). The
set function
v(A) = sup
P∈P
P(A), A ∈A, (40)
is called the upper envelope of P , and it is a capacity if P is
weakly compact. Note that such upper envelopes are just the
analogue of the XOS valuations defined in Section 2 for the
finite setting. By an extension of Fact 6 to infinite games, one
can deduce that the corePv is nonempty when v is the upper
envelope game for a weakly compact familyP of probability
measures.
We say that the infinite game v is concave if, for all
measurable sets s and t,
v(s∪ t) + v(s∩ t) ≤ v(s) + v(t). (41)
In the mathematics literature, the value function of a
concave infinite game is often called a 2-alternating capacity,
following Choquet’s seminal work [43]. When v defines a
concave infinite game, Pv is nonempty; this is an analog of
Fact 2. Furthermore, by the analog of Fact 5, v is an exact
game since it is concave, and as in the remarks after Fact 6, it
follows that v is just the upper envelope of Pv.
Concave infinite games v are not just of abstract interest;
the families of probability measures Pv that are their cores
include important classes of families such as total variation
neighborhoods and contamination neighborhoods, as dis-
cussed in the references cited below.
A famous, classical result of Huber and Strassen [44]
can be stated in the language of infinite cooperative games.
Suppose one wishes to test between the composite hypothe-
ses Pu and Pv, where u and v define infinite games. The
criterion that one wishes to minimize is the decay rate of the
probability of one type of error in the worst case (i.e., for
the worst pair of sources in the two classes), given that the
error probability of the other kind is kept below some small
constant; in other words, one is using the minimax criterion
in the Neyman-Pearson framework. Note that the selection
of a critical region for testing is, in the game language, the
selection of a coalition. In the setting of simple hypotheses,
the optimal coalition is obtained as the set for which
the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the two probability
measures corresponding to the two hypotheses exceeds a
threshold. Although there is no obvious notion of Radon-
Nikodym derivative between two composite hypotheses, [44]
demonstrates that a likelihood ratio test continues to be
optimal for testing between composite hypotheses under
some conditions on the games u and v.
Translation 10. For concave infinite games u and v, consider
the composite hypotheses Pu and Pv that are their cores.
Then, a minimax Neyman-Pearson test between the Pu and
Pv can be constructed as the likelihood ratio test between an
element of Pu and one of Pv; in this case, the representative
elements minimize the Kullback divergence between the two
families.
In a certain sense, a converse statement can also be shown
to hold. We refer to Huber and Strassen [44] for proofs
and to Veeravalli et al. [45] for context, further results, and
applications. Related results for minimax linear smoothing
and rate distortion theory on classes of sources were given by
Poor [46, 47] and to channel coding with model uncertainty
were given by Geraniotis [48, 49].
8. DISCUSSION
The general approach to using cooperative game theory to
understand rate or capacity regions involves the following
steps. (i) Formulate the region of interest as the aspiration
set of a cooperative game. This is frequently the right kind of
formulation formultiuser problems. (ii) Study the properties
of the value function of the game, starting with checking
if it is balanced, if it is exact, if it has a large core, and
ultimately by checking convexity or concavity. (iii) Interpret
the properties of the game that follow from the discovered
properties of the value function. For instance, balancedness
implies a nonempty core, while convexity implies a host of
results, including nice properties of the Shapley value. These
are structural results, and their game-theoretic interpretation
has the potential to provide some additional intuition.
There are numerous other papers which make use
of cooperative game theory in communications, although
with different emphases and applications in mind. See, for
example, van den Nouweland et al. [50], Han and Poor [51],
Jiang and Baras [52], and Yaı¨che et al. [53]. However, we have
pointed out a very fundamental connection between the two
fields—arising from the fact that rate and capacity regions
are often closely related to the aspiration sets of cooperative
games. In several exemplary scenarios, both classical and
relatively new, we have reinterpreted known results in terms
of game-theoretic intuition and also pointed out a number
of open problems. We expect that the cooperative game
theoretic point of view will find utility in other scenarios
in network information theory, distributed inference, and
robust statistics.
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